APPENDIX 3.x.x.

GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR THE APPLICATION OF COMPARTMENTALISATION

Article 3.x.x.1

Introduction and objectives

...

For the purpose of *international trade*, *compartments* must be under the ~~direct control and~~ responsibility of the *Veterinary Administration* in the country. For the purposes of this Appendix compliance by the Member Countries with Chapters 1.1.2. and 1.3.3. are an essential prerequisite.

> **Rationale**: Article 3.x.x.8 of these draft guidelines provide for guidance of supervision and control of a compartment. While the Veterinary Administration has the final authority for granting, suspending or revoking the status of a compartment, it does not have 'direct' control of a compartment. Direct control is provided by the management of the operation.

Article 3.x.x.3

Separation of a compartment from potential sources of infection

The management of a *compartment* must provide to the *Veterinary Administration* documented evidence on the following:

a) ....

b) Infrastructural factors

Structural aspects of the *establishments* within a *compartment* contribute to the effectiveness of its biosecurity. Consideration should be given to:

i) fencing or other effective means of physical separation;

ii) facilities for people entry including access control, changing area and showers;

iii) *vehicle* access including washing and *disinfection* procedures;

iv) *unloading* and *loading* facilities;

v) isolation facilities for introduced animals.

vi) infrastructure to store feed and veterinary products;

vii) disposal of carcasses, manure and waste;

viii) water supply.

ix) Physical measures to prevent exposure to living mechanical or biological vectors such as insects, rodents and wild birds;

x) Air supply

xi) Feed supply/source

Rationale for added text to Article 3.X.X.3: The three areas identified above are sometimes overlooked when assessing the physical factors of a building that can affect the risk of exposure to a disease agent. These are physical measures (barriers), air supply/source, and feed supply.

More detailed recommendations for certain *establishments* can be found in Sections 3.2., 3.3. and 3.4. of the *Terrestrial Code*.

c) Biosecurity plan

The integrity of the *compartment* relies on effective biosecurity. The management of the *compartment* should develop, implement and monitor a comprehensive biosecurity plan.

The biosecurity plan should describe in detail:

i) ...

vii) the programme for educating and training workers to ensure that all persons involved are knowledgeable and informed on biosecurity principles and practices.

In any case, sufficient evidence should be submitted to assess the efficacy of the biosecurity plan in accordance with the level of risk for each identified pathway. The biosecurity risk of all operations of the *compartment* should be regularly re-assessed and documented at least on a yearly basis. Based on the outcome, concrete and documented

mitigation steps should be taken to reduce the likelihood of introduction of the disease agent into the *compartment*.

> **Rationale:** The United States recommends specifying some general time frame for re-assessing the biosecurity risk of a compartment. To some, a "regular" re-assessment may mean once a decade, and hence, the suggested minimum time for regular assessments. Such re-assessment should be documented.

d) Traceability system

A prerequisite for assessing the integrity of a *compartment* is the existence of a valid traceability system. All animals or epidemiologically separate groups of animals (flocks) within a *compartment* should be individually identified and registered in such a way that their history can be audited. In cases where individual identification may not be feasible, such as broilers ~~and~~ day-old chicks, and groups of feeding swine, the *Veterinary Administration* should provide sufficient assurance of traceability.

> **Rationale:** For certain animal production industries, in particular the swine and poultry industries, the number of animals in their rearing groups are simply too large for individual identification to be feasible. In these cases group identification is more efficient since management practices maintain group/lot identity and integrity.

All animal movements into and out of the compartment should be certified by the *Veterinary Administration* and recorded at the *compartment* level.

Article 3.x.x.4

Documentation of operational information and data demonstrating the integrity of the defined ~~of factors critical to the definition of a~~ compartment

Comment/rationale: The United States suggests re-naming Article 3.X.X.4 as shown above to distinguish it from the documentation required under Article 3.X.X.3. Article 3.X.X.3 refers to the basic factors that need to be considered for defining a compartment; whereas the intent of Article 3.X.X.4 addresses the documentation required to show that the integrity of the compartment is being maintained. The United States also recommends adding the words "and consistently" to the paragraph immediately below to indicate that management practices are both effectively and consistently applied.

Documentation must provide clear evidence that the biosecurity, surveillance, traceability and management practices defined for a *compartment* are effectively and consistently applied. In addition to animal movement information, the necessary documentation should include herd or flock production records, feed sources, laboratory tests, birth and death records, the visitor logbook, morbidity history, medication and vaccination records, biosecurity plans, training documentation and any other criteria necessary for the evaluation of disease exclusion.

The historical status of a *compartment* for the *disease(s)* for which it was defined should be documented and demonstrate compliance with the requirements for freedom in the relevant *Terrestrial Code* chapter.

In addition, a *compartment* seeking recognition should submit to the *Veterinary Administration* a baseline animal health report indicating the presence or absence of OIE *listed diseases*. This report should be regularly updated to reflect the current animal health situation of the *compartment*.

Vaccination records including the type of vaccine and frequency of administration must be available to enable interpretation of surveillance data.

The time period for which all records should be kept may vary according to the species and *disease(s)* for which the *compartment* was defined.

All information must be recorded in a transparent manner and be easily accessible so as to be auditable by the *Veterinary Administration.*

Article 3.x.x.7

Emergency response and notification

Early detection, establishment/compartment response, diagnosis and notification of *disease* are critical to minimise the consequences of *outbreaks*.

Comment/rationale: A key measure to managing an incident is not to have an incident. "Local" response is a key measure. If detection occurs in a compartment, there should be a shut-down process to prevent further spread of the agent of concern.

In case of a suspicion or occurrence of any OIE *listed disease* not present according to the baseline animal health report of the *compartment* referred to in Article 3.x.x.4., the management of the *compartment* should notify the *Veterinary Administration*, as this may indicate a breach in the biosecurity measures. The *Veterinary Administration* should immediately suspend export certification and should notify the *importing countries*. Trade may only be resumed after the *compartment* has adopted the necessary measures to re-establish the biosecurity level and the *Veterinary Administration* re-approves the *compartment* for trade.

Positive findings of the *disease(s)* for which the *compartment* has been defined, should be immediately notified following the provisions of Chapter 1.1.2.